Ulaanbaatar Process

A Civil Society Dialogue for Peace and Stability in Northeast Asia

FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT

Section 1. Background
1.1 The Northeast Asia region remains characterized by Cold War era political interactions. The region is, at times, charged with fierce rhetoric amid fears of military escalation, and lacks institutional mechanisms for peace and security. The Korean Peninsula remains in an armistice system, without a peace treaty to end the Korean War. The absence of sustained dialogue and repeated military aggressions have heightened tensions within the Korean Peninsula and across the region.

1.2 Launched in 2003, the Six Party Talks involve China, the DPRK, the ROK, Russia, Japan and the US. The Talks are the closest alternative to an institutional mechanism for regional peace and security, and have been the best available tool for peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue in Northeast Asia. Various rounds have achieved some results, demonstrating that progress in regional engagement is possible. Yet the suspension of the Talks since 2009 and increasing calls for a hard-line response have left little room for the resumption of dialogue on a governmental level.

1.3 Inflammatory rhetoric and the escalation of several territorial disputes in the region emphasize the need to maintain space for dialogue and build trust and confidence between all parties. In order to move towards realizing regional peace and stability, it is imperative to revitalize dialogue processes on wide-ranging issues, including the Six Party Talks, based on mutual trust and confidence among all parties.

1.4 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, and of the division of the Korean Peninsula. This serves as a reminder of the urgency of resolution of issues facing the region, and the importance of frank and open dialogue and mutual respect. In a Northeast Asia that has not yet fully come to terms with its turbulent history, civil society can pave the way in opening channels for sustained engagement, cooperation and region-wide confidence building.

Section 2. Introduction
2.1 As a worldwide alliance of civil society organizations structured around 15 regional networks, based on a network approach of information exchange and sharing of experiences, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) is well placed to convene and facilitate the Ulaanbaatar Process. Dialogue and Mediation is a key priority of GPPAC, supported by a working group comprised of representatives from nine regions, including Northeast Asia. With extensive practical experience in facilitating such processes, this group seeks to promote and enhance dialogue and mediation practices and processes in the regions, by generating knowledge, exchanging experiences and cooperating cross-regionally.

2.2 The concept for such a civil society dialogue process was first proposed by GPPAC Northeast Asia in the Regional Action Agenda adopted at the network's launch in Tokyo on February 2, 2005. Building upon the regional network developed in the following years, the Ulaanbaatar Process was officially launched in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia on June 23-24, 2015. This was immediately prior to the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security International Conference organized by the Mongolian Government / Institute for Strategic Studies on June 25-26, 2015.

2.3 Central to the Ulaanbaatar Process is the emerging strategic role of Mongolia within the Northeast Asian
context. Mongolia is a state with internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free status that benefits from political security assurances of the five nuclear weapon states. It also maintains friendly diplomatic relations with all the states of the Six Party Talks and other states of the region. Hence it is well-positioned to play a significant and unique role as provider of political space and venue as well as a possible mediator for regional dialogue. The Mongolian government has supported GPPAC by hosting regional GPPAC meetings in 2007, 2010 and 2014 in Ulaanbaatar, focusing on various issues, including reducing nuclear threats through regional dialogue. GPPAC’s Ulaanbaatar Focal Point, the NGO Blue Banner, plays the lead role in this coordination. Reflecting the role of Mongolia in this process, this dialogue is referred to as the ‘Ulaanbaatar Process’.

2.4 Crucially, the Ulaanbaatar Process creates space for civil society perspectives from across the region, including both the DPRK and ROK, to be heard in the same forum. As a global network based on multi-stakeholder collaboration, with a foundation for constructive dialogue already developed by the GPPAC-NEA network in the region and with a neutral platform and location in Mongolia to convene the different parties, the Ulaanbaatar Process is uniquely positioned to serve as an effective regional Track 2 dialogue.

Section 3. Objectives
3.1 The overall objective of the Ulaanbaatar Process is to support the creation of peace and stability throughout Northeast Asia, through the promotion of civil society dialogue.

3.2 The specific objectives of the Ulaanbaatar Process are:
   3.2.1 To strengthen the role of civil society in the context of building peace and stability in Northeast Asia
   3.2.2 To complement and contribute recommendations to official processes
   3.2.3 To support the development of an institutionalized regional mechanism supporting dialogue and reconciliation in Northeast Asia
   3.2.4 To contribute to overall confidence-building measures within the Northeast Asian region

Section 4. Expected Impact
4.1 In strengthening the role of civil society to contribute to regional peace and security, the expected impact of the Ulaanbaatar Process is as follows:
   4.1.1 Opportunities for civil society representatives from the entire Northeast Asian region and from the larger GPPAC network, including representatives from the United States, to meet and exchange knowledge on a regular basis are created.
   4.1.2 Collaboration among civil society actors on initiatives to promote peace and stability in the region is strengthened.
   4.1.3 The Ulaanbaatar Process receives recognition and support from the countries in the region.
   4.1.4 Increased level of trust and collaboration amongst civil society groups in the region.
   4.1.5 Suggestions and recommendations coming out of the Ulaanbaatar process are increasingly discussed among governments and other relevant stakeholders in the region.

Section 5. Governing Principles
5.1 The Ulaanbaatar Process, in its activities and practices, will be:
   • Inclusive
   • Respectful of cultural norms and differences
   • Focused on peacebuilding opportunities, rather than security threats
   • Attentive to human security concerns
   • Cognizant of regional and global geopolitical realities
   • Collaborative
   • Open and respectful in its communication

Section 6. Priority Thematic Areas
6.1 As decided at the inaugural Ulaanbaatar Process Meeting (23-24 June 2015), the Ulaanbaatar Process will address selected core themes and cross-cutting issues in 2015 and 2016.
   6.1.1 In 2015-2016, the Ulaanbaatar Process will address the following Main Themes:
a) Issues pertaining to peace and human security on the Korean Peninsula
b) Establishment of a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

6.1.2 The interconnectedness of the two main themes was recognized. Subtopics to be addressed in the context of the two main themes listed in 6.1.1 include but are not limited to:
• Ending the Korean War with the replacement of the armistice with a permanent peace treaty
• Trust and confidence building in Northeast Asia
• Denuclearization and disarmament of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia
• Energy security in Northeast Asia

6.1.3 The Ulaanbaatar Process will also address the following Cross-cutting Issues in this stage:
   a) The role of civil society in Northeast Asian security and peace dialogue
   b) Gender mainstreaming and equality in Northeast Asia

6.2 While the above-mentioned topics have been identified for the period 2015-2016, the Process may continue to address them should participants feel that they remain relevant. Alternatively, the participants of the Ulaanbaatar Process may redefine the priority thematic areas after discussion and consensus amongst themselves.

6.3 Each Ulaanbaatar Process Meeting will seek to address at least one priority thematic area in detail.

Section 7. Relationship to to Official Processes
7.1 The Ulaanbaatar Process will seek a complementary relationship with the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue for Northeast Asian Security, facilitated by the NGO Blue Banner in consultation and agreement with the GPPAC Global Secretariat and the GPPAC NEA Regional Secretariat.

7.2 Contributions to Track 1 and 1.5 Processes will be pursued, particularly through the transmission of relevant outcomes of Ulaanbaatar Process meetings to relevant actors.

Section 8. Coordination and Participation
8.1 The coordinating members of the Ulaanbaatar Process are the GPPAC Global Secretariat and Northeast Asia Regional Secretariat, and Mongolian NGO Blue Banner. These bodies will be responsible for strategic and programme coordination, logistical management, resource mobilization, monitoring and evaluation, and communications, with duties to be allocated amongst the three.

8.1.1 GPPAC Global Secretariat: The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) is a worldwide civil society network structured around 15 regional networks. GPPAC promotes conflict prevention and peacebuilding through a network and multi-stakeholder approach. The Global Secretariat, based in the Hague, operates under the GPPAC Foundation and supports the work of the GPPAC network, through facilitating and ensuring synergy and coherence of GPPAC activities.

8.1.2 GPPAC Northeast Asia Regional Secretariat: The Northeast Asia region of GPPAC is a network of CSOs that closely collaborate throughout the region, with focal points and partners in Beijing, Hong Kong, Kyoto, Pyongyang, Seoul, Shanghai, Taipei, Tokyo, Ulaanbaatar and Vladivostok. A civil society-led dialogue process in support of dialogue is a long-standing priority for GPPAC NEA. The Regional Secretariat is based at the NGO Peace Boat in Tokyo.

8.1.3 Blue Banner: A Mongolian non-governmental organization established in 2005 to promote nuclear non-proliferation and Mongolia’s initiative to turn the country into a single-State nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ). It believes that the government of Mongolia needs to promote more vigorously the policy of establishing and institutionalizing the concept of the single-State NWFZ, and that independent NGOs and think tanks can make useful practical suggestions to the government on the ways and means of promoting the initiative, including the form and content of Mongolia’s unique status. To that end it undertakes special area studies and presents its findings and recommendations to the general public or the government as the case may be.

8.2 Participants in the Ulaanbaatar Process will comprise a combination of GPPAC Northeast Asia members and delegates from partner civil society organizations. Furthermore, other actors may be invited according to relevant
experience in relation to thematic areas being addressed, upon consultation with regional participants and coordinators. Participating organizations of the Ulaanbaatar Process are expected to make an institutional commitment to being present at relevant meetings and to being involved in the Process as a whole through active communication between meetings. (For a list of participants of the Ulaanbaatar Process at the time of launching, please see Annexe: List of Participants)

Section 9. Engagement and Target Groups
9.1 Participants of the Process recognize that its positioning as the unique regular meeting of representatives of civil society groups from Northeast Asia is its strength. As such, participation in the Ulaanbaatar Process will continue to be limited to individuals and civil society groups, bearing in mind that:

9.1.1 With a focus on creating and supporting peacebuilding opportunities, the discussions will address how civil society can resolve both traditional and non-traditional security challenges through peaceful and collaborative means. To this end, experts on dialogue and mediation, including representatives of GPPAC's Dialogue and Mediation Working Group, may also be invited.

9.1.2 Participants in the Ulaanbaatar Process have links and channels of communication with government, think tanks, and security sector, peace and other networks. The Process can engage secondary actors without directly inviting them to participate in meetings by relying on the connections and communications channels of Participants.

9.2 Where the Process stands to gain from the involvement of governments, regional organizations or international organizations (henceforth, "Officials") the participants and coordinating members may:

9.2.1 organize side meetings with Officials and some or all of the Ulaanbaatar Process participants
9.2.2 invite Officials to make presentations or participate in discussions in specific sessions as resource persons
9.2.3 bring recommendations from Official meetings, to the Ulaanbaatar Process for discussion and analysis

9.3 The participants of the Process also recognized the need to engage with individuals and organizations with opposing or alternative views in order to better understand their concerns, preconceptions, priorities and constraints.

9.4 The Ulaanbaatar Process may seek the involvement or participation of experts and activists from other regions, particularly recognizing the value of learning from other peacebuilding, reconciliation and regional integration efforts.

9.5 Mass media and social media are identified as key stakeholder groups with which the Ulaanbaatar Process should aim to engage.

Section 10. Core activities – Making a habit of Dialogue
10.1 The core activity of the Ulaanbaatar Process is the dialogue between Northeast Asian civil society members in itself. To this end, the Process aims to:

• Hold regular, face-to-face, closed-door meetings among members of civil society groups in the Northeast Asian region
• Change the prevailing narrative surrounding the contentious geopolitical relationships in the Northeast Asian region by promoting communication and cooperation amongst the Participants of the Process. Demonstrate that sincere and constructive dialogue is possible in Northeast Asia by establishing a safe space for participation from all countries.

10.2 Other potential activities of the Ulaanbaatar Process to create opportunities for collaboration and cooperation outside of the annual meetings

• Working groups – to prepare or organize follow-up activities on specific topics between meetings; to provide regular updates to national governments
• Alternative meetings – Virtual webinars or roundtables could be organized between annual face-to-face meetings
• Capacity-development initiatives – Workshops and seminars could be organized by Participants to share skills or knowledge
• Joint action – Actions on specific issues can be organized by interested Participants
• Report Sessions in Track 1 or Track 1.5 Meetings

10.3 In addition to face-to-face meetings,
• Strategic and targeted action-oriented policy recommendations could be prepared in the form of brief communiques and disseminated to governments and Track 1 or 1.5 level meetings
• Journal articles analyzing key issues in the region or outlining the outcome of the Ulaanbaatar Process could be written by Participants

Section 11. Funding
11.1 The three Coordinating Members will be responsible for mobilizing resources for the Ulaanbaatar Process, including for both specific activities and meetings and the ongoing management of the process itself.
11.2 Other Participants are not obliged to make financial commitments, however any contributions will be welcome, including in kind contributions and cooperation in fundraising efforts.

Section 12. Visibility
12.1 The Coordinating Members will be responsible for ensuring that the Process’ interactions with media stakeholders are in-line with its overall media strategy.
12.2 All Participants of the Ulaanbaatar Process will be responsible for the visibility of the Process, in particular in their own country/context of work. In this regard, Participants are encouraged to share non-confidential material concerning the Process with their media contacts.
12.3 In the interest of maintaining a frank and open dialogue, Ulaanbaatar Process Meetings will be treated as confidential, and statements made during meetings will not be attributable to any individual unless permission has been expressly granted by the Participants of the Process. All questions regarding confidentiality should be addressed to the GPPAC Regional Secretariat.

Section 13. Time-frame and Targets
13.1 Year 1
  13.1.1 Resource mobilization is secured in line with the plans agreed upon for 2016 activities
  13.1.2 A funding plan (for longer-term activities) is prepared and endorsed by members
  13.1.3 A visibility plan is prepared and endorsed by members
  13.1.4 Organization of 2nd Ulaanbaatar Process Meeting in Ulaanbaatar in mid-2016. (TBC pending availability of funds and suitability of proposed timing of the Meeting)
  13.1.5 Government contacts are informed and updated
13.2 Years 2-5
  13.2.1 Organization of annual Ulaanbaatar Process Meetings
  13.2.2 Review of the Ulaanbaatar Process and evaluation of its reach and impact to be conducted
  13.2.4 Project-based funding is sought and obtained for selected Ulaanbaatar Process activities
  13.2.5 Outcomes of the Ulaanbaatar Process are gradually and increasingly visible and measurable

Section 14. Monitoring and Evaluation
14.1 Internal reporting
The activities organized as part of the Ulaanbaatar Process will be subject to a regular monitoring and evaluation process. GPPAC will be responsible to organize this, consistent with the collaborative methodology it is applying across its network. In technical terms, GPPAC utilizes "Outcome Mapping", which allows for a deeper appreciation for the diversity of factors which affect the complexities inherent in long-term, effective dialogue. Outcome Mapping provides a suitable approach for the Ulaanbaatar to monitor, reflect and learn on how civil society can be strengthened and best contribute to the peace and security of the Northeast Asian region.