In advance of the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT RevCon), the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) Northeast Asia, Japan Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) co-convened a closed webinar to discuss practical steps for Northeast Asia regional cooperation to reduce nuclear threats and advance disarmament. This paper summarizes the resulting insights and recommendations.
(The same content can be viewed/downloaded in the PDF below, or the following text).
Click here for a summary in Japanese language, courtesy of the Japan Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.
The region, and world, now faces an existential crisis driven by a complex and unstable security environment, serious competition, further proliferation, and arms races, which have eroded trust and challenged the legitimacy of the rule-based order. In Northeast Asia, China is increasing its nuclear arsenal and the DPRK is becoming a fully nuclear-armed state, raising nuclear threats in the region. Also noted was the uncertainty over the future of Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles, as well as the reliability of the US as a responsible actor. This situation represents the complexity of “reassurance,” with different kinds needed across various directions— between allies and adversaries. Reassurance provided to one is often perceived as a threat by another, creating a difficult background of arms race and nuclear proliferation. There is thus a pressing need for regional disarmament and nuclear arms control, with increasingly important roles for civil society and middle power countries committed to international norms.
Despite pessimism regarding the prospects for a successful outcome, the 2026 NPT RevCon remains a vital opportunity for sincere disarmament dialogue. The NPT regime’s credibility is currently at a serious risk, standing at a critical crossroads due to challenges such as a structural shift away from a unipolar world, weakening arms control frameworks, and situational changes in leaders’ behaviors. This is compounded in Northeast Asia by the uncomfortable reality that denuclearization diplomacy for the Korean Peninsula has failed, resulting in an increased actual risk of nuclear use. Granting the DPRK de facto nuclear weapon state status would undermine the non-proliferation commitments of other states, potentially providing a pretext for the ROK’s push for enrichment, reprocessing, and nuclear-powered submarines. Participants stressed the need to pursue peace in parallel—including normalizing diplomatic relations and encouraging US-DPRK and Japan-DPRK talks—as a prerequisite for achieving the ultimate goal of denuclearization.
Shifting dynamics and competition between China and the US formed another core discussion theme. As the US shifts away from the rules-based international order, China is hesitant about its role—multipolar, bipolar, or unipolar—and currently lacks a policy toolbox suited to its desired future. This leads to mixed actions, such as China supporting international organizations including the United Nations while simultaneously demonstrating power in the region. China’s mixed nuclear approach, combining a commitment to no-first-use (NFU) with an un-reassuring build-up and intransparency, underscores the need for dialogue. The US fear of China is heightened by a lack of exchange in policy spaces, and both countries tend to exaggerate the other’s influence in the Asia-Pacific, increasing threat perceptions. Extended deterrence was also discussed. Some see it as a realistic security policy preventing proliferation, while others emphasise the need for dialogue toward common understanding. It was noted that strengthening extended deterrence could increase the risk of nuclear conflict, to say nothing of the legal question of the compatibility of nuclear sharing with the NPT. To foster progress, creative thinking is needed to move away from hard coercive approaches toward more innovative policies, as well as opportunities for interaction with policy leaders to bridge these gaps.
Proposals to the 2026 NPT Review Conference from the Regional Perspective
In considering these challenges, participants emphasized the need for strengthening non-proliferation and promoting disarmament. Specific agenda items and recommendations proposed included:
- Non-Proliferation Commitments: ROK, Japan, and the US to reaffirm commitment to the NPT, and ROK and Japan to commit to non-nuclear status, including enhanced domestic legislation to lock in commitments against nuclear latency, regardless of future changes in government.
- Nuclear Arsenal Reduction and Elimination: Re-state the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons while simultaneously seeking both the capping and reduction of nuclear arsenals. A follow-up mechanism to New START is needed as we see the return of the US-Russia nuclear arms race and nuclear expansion by other countries, including China. Yet, singling out any one specific country would not be constructive.
- Transparency and Accountability: The RevCon should reinforce the norm that major nuclear buildups cannot remain politically insulated from international scrutiny; opacity itself has become a source of strategic risk.
- N5 Coordination and Joint Statements: Past failures of unilateral approaches emphasise the need for the 5 Nuclear Weapon States (N5) coordination as a priority. The N5 should issue joint statements to reaffirm their commitment to disarmament, and also explain their understanding of extended deterrence and the modernization of their arsenals.
- Nuclear Risk Reduction: As a pragmatic measure, the N5 should recommit to measures to assure Non Nuclear Weapon States, while engaging in more discussion on strategic stability. Risk reduction efforts must be based on accepting and respecting mutual vulnerability.
- Testing Moratorium: The nuclear testing moratorium must be upheld by all. A joint N5 statement on recommitment would reassure other states. Bilateral collaboration such as between China-US on testing criteria, or cooperation towards verification of closure of test sites, would also be helpful.
- A Pro-Active Role for China: Actions by China to demonstrate commitment to a law-based order through the NPT platform, such as improving the NPT review process through accountability mechanisms, would be supported by other governments and NGOs.
- NFU Treaty: Discussions should be held on concrete proposals to strengthen NFU policies, including examining China’s proposed legally binding multilateral treaty, and its potential dual-track submission to both the NPT and the UNGA First Committee.
- Korean Peninsula Denuclearization: The goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be reaffirmed. The DPRK nuclear programme reduces the credibility of the NPT regime, and all regional states, including China and Russia, should take serious, cooperative steps toward denuclearization.
- Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ): While a Middle East NWFZ will be a priority at the NPT, regional initiatives and future aspirations for a Northeast Asia NWFZ should also be noted.
In this current situation of geopolitical competition, an integrated approach with dialogue on nonproliferation and nuclear risk reduction such as at the NPT hand-in-hand with security and peace mechanisms is vital. A better chance of denuclearization exists only when the region is peaceful. Given the increasing difficulty of physical travel, participants reaffirmed the essential nature of dialogue, and the organisers their commitment to continuing to foster such spaces.
Discussion participants (alphabetical order, titles omitted):
ASANO Hideo, Japan Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (JCANW); ENKHSAIKHAN Jargalsaikhan, Blue Banner; HATAKEYAMA Sumiko, Peace Boat; Austin HEADRICK, American Friends Service Committee (AFSC); JIANG Tianjiao, Fudan University; Meri JOYCE, GPPAC / Peace Boat; JUN Bonggeun, Korea National Diplomatic Academy/Sejong Institute; KAWASAKI Akira, Peace Boat / International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) / JCANW; LEE Youngah, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD); LIM Eunjung, Kongju National University / Stanford University; NISHIDA Michiru, Nagasaki University; NIU Qiyang, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD); Joel PETERSSON-IVRE, Asia Pacific Leadership Network (APLN); Hree Putri SAMUDRA, (APLN); WANG Danning, Charhar Institute; WATANABE Yosuke, Peace Depot ; YOSHIOKA Tatsuya, GPPAC / Peace Boat
This paper is prepared at the sole responsibility of GPPAC Northeast Asia, and does not represent the views of all participants.
Contact: Meri Joyce, GPPAC Northeast Asia Regional Liaison Officer (meri(a)peaceboat.gr.jp)